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Outsourcing computing allows users with resource-constrained devices to outsource their complex computation
workloads to cloud servers that may not be honest. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for securing the
outsourcing of composite modular exponentiation, which is one of the most complex computing tasks in discrete-
log based cryptographic protocols. Unlike algorithms based on two untrusted servers, we outsource modular
exponentiation operation to only a single server, which eliminates the potential for a collusion attack when using
two servers. Moreover, our proposed algorithm can hide the base and exponent of the outsourced data, which
prevents the exposure of sensitive information to cloud servers. In addition, compared with the state-of-the-art
algorithms, our scheme has remarkably better checkability. The user could detect any misbehavior with a
probability of one if the server returns a fault result.1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a service that enables convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of conﬁgurable computing resources
that can be instantly deployed and released using minimal management
effort [1]. With the rapid development of cloud computing, outsourcing
computing has emerged as a new paradigm. This allows users with
resource-constrained devices to outsource their complex computational
tasks to cloud servers and enjoy unlimited computing resources in a
convenient pay-per-use manner. During the whole process of
outsourcing, clients do not need to buy any physical servers, storage,
software, etc., and do not need to worry about the source of the service.
They can directly use the desired services and applications through
the network.
Although outsourcing computation provides great convenience for
users, it inevitably creates some new security concerns and challenges
[2]. First, outsourced computation tasks often contain sensitive infor-
mation [3] such as personal medical records, personal income status and
family member information, which should not be exposed to cloud
servers. Therefore, protecting a user’s sensitive input/output information
is one of the biggest challenges that has arisen with the progress on
outsourcing data [4]. Second, because cloud servers are not fully trusted
[5], they may return incorrect results. For example, outsourced calcula-
tions often require large quantities of computing resources. If usersApril 2017; Accepted 3 May 2017
td. This is an open access article undcannot determine whether the cloud server’s outputs is correct, the cloud
server may be “lazy” to save resources [6]. In addition, software bugs and
malicious attacks from adversaries may affect the correctness of the
calculation results [7]. As a result, efﬁciently verifying the outsourced
computation results is another important security challenge that has
arisen with the progress on outsourcing data. If the outsourcer can verify
the results returned by the server with high probability, it is easy to
detect any misbehavior of the server.
To address these two key issues, many studies have been performed to
ﬁnd ways securely outsource expensive computations. Chaum et al. [8]
ﬁrst introduced the concept of “wallets with observers”, which allows
users to install a piece of hardware on their computers to handle some
expensive computing workloads. Atallah et al. [16] studied the secure
outsourcing of numerical calculations and scientiﬁc computing for the
ﬁrst time, and proposed a few effective hiding techniques for scientiﬁc
computations such as matrix multiplication, inequalities and linear
equations. These hiding techniques can guarantee the security and pri-
vacy of users' data. Hohenberger et al. [9] ﬁrst provided a formal security
deﬁnition and a security model for outsourcing computations, and pro-
posed a secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation based
on two non-colluding cloud servers.
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm, called CExp for the secure
outsourcing of composite modular exponentiation. Our main contribu-
tions are summarized as follows:er the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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source the modular exponentiation operation to only a single server.
As a result, it can eliminate the potential for a collusion attack that
exists when using two servers.
2) Our proposed algorithm can hide the base and exponent of the out-
sourced data utilizing a new mathematical division operation.
Therefore, our algorithm can realize complete input and output
privacy.
3) In particular, compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms, our
algorithm gets remarkably better in checkability. The outsourcer can
detect any misbehavior with a probability of one. Thus it is not
possible for the outsourcer to be cheated by the cloud server.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a review of the related work on secure outsourcing computation schemes.
Section 3 introduces the security deﬁnition and system model. The pro-
posed algorithm for modular exponentiation is presented in section 4. We
provide a security analysis of the proposed algorithm in section 5. Section
6 evaluates the performance of CExp. Finally, this paper is concluded in
section 7.
2. Related work
Atallah et al. [16] ﬁrst studied the secure outsourcing of numerical
calculations and scientiﬁc computing, and proposed some disguise
techniques for scientiﬁc computations such as matrix multiplication,
inequalities and linear equations. These disguise techniques can ensure
the security and privacy of the user’s data. However, they did not discuss
the problem that the results cannot be veriﬁed. Benjamin et al. [17] used
a semantically secure encryption scheme for expensive linear algebra
computations (e.g. the multiplication of huge matrices) to construct a
veriﬁable security outsourcing computing protocol for complicated cal-
culations. Gentry et al. [18] ﬁrst introduced and formalized the notion of
veriﬁable computation, and many effectual studies can be found in this
area [19–22]. Moreover, Gentry et al. [18] proposed a fully-homorphic
encryption scheme to achieve exceedingly efﬁcient outsourcing, and
this scheme can ensure the privacy of the client's inputs and outputs.
Atallah et al. [23] proposed a protocol that outsources matrix multipli-
cation based on the weak secret hiding assumption, but this protocol
requires the client to perform homomorphic encryption. Subsequently,
Wang et al. [24] utilized hiding techniques, iterative methods and
semantically secure additive homomorphic encryption, and proposed
efﬁcient mechanisms for solving large-scale systems of linear equations
in the cloud.
In the cryptographic community, various outsourcing modular expo-
nentiation algorithms [8]– [15] have been designed. Chaum et al. [8]
ﬁrst introduced the notion of “wallets with observers”, which allows
users to install a piece of hardware on their computers to handle some
expensive computing workloads. Hohenberger et al. [9] provided a
formal security deﬁnition for outsourcing computations, and proposed a
secure outsourcing algorithm for exponentiation modulo a prime based
on two non-colluding cloud servers. Based on these protocols, Hohen-
berger et al. [9] achieved outsource-secure Cramer-Shoup encryptions
and Schnorr signatures in the cloud environment. However, the check-
ability of the results with their scheme is only 1/2. Chen et al. [10]
proposed a new secure outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation
based on two untrusted program models. Compared with the algorithm
[9], the proposed scheme is superior in both efﬁciency and checkability.
Meanwhile, Chen et al. also proposed the ﬁrst secure and efﬁcient
outsourcing algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations in [10].
Ye et al. [11] proposed a novel secure outsourcing algorithm for modular
exponentiation based on a new mathematical division operation under
two non-colluding cloud servers. The base and exponent of the out-
sourced data can be kept private and the user's computational burden is
greatly reduced. Note that all the algorithms in [9]–[11] are based on two
untrusted servers. Therefore, they may suffer from a collusion attack237[10]. Dijk et al. [12] proposed the ﬁrst outsourcing scheme for modular
exponentiation with a single untrusted program. Unfortunately, because
the base of the outsourced exponentiation is exposed to the untrusted
server, their scheme cannot guarantee the privacy of the queried input.
Ma et al. [13] proposed a new outsourcing scheme for multiple modular
exponentiations based on a single untrusted server. Compared with the
schemes in [9,10], it does not require complex pre-computation opera-
tions which makes it more efﬁcient when solving multiple modular ex-
ponentiations. However, their scheme has obvious defects in relation to
privacy and the bases and exponents of the outsourced data are public for
the servers. Wang et al. [14] proposed a new outsourcing scheme for
modular exponentiation with a single untrusted server. This scheme can
guarantee the privacy of the exponent and base, but the checkability of
the result is just 1/2. Recently, Ding et al. [15] proposed a new secure
outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiations based on a single
untrusted program model. The checkability of the algorithm in [15] is
much better than that of the algorithm proposed in Ref. [14].
3. Security deﬁnition and system model
3.1. Security deﬁnition
We say that a trusted entity T securely outsources some tasks to an
untrusted program U, and (T,U) turns into an outsource-secure imple-
mentation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg if (1) T and U implement Alg
together, i.e., Alg¼TU and (2) even if T provides oracle access to a ma-
licious U
0
that remembers all of its computations over time and tries to
behave maliciously, U
0
cannot learn any useful information about the
input or output of TU
0
. In the following, we introduce the security deﬁ-
nition for the secure outsourcing algorithm [9].
Deﬁnition 1. (Algorithm with outsource-I/O). An algorithm Alg com-
plies with the outsource input/output speciﬁcation if it takes ﬁve inputs
and generates three outputs. An honest party generates the ﬁrst three
inputs, which are classiﬁed by howmuch the adversary A¼ (E,U0) knows
about them, where E is the adversarial environment that submits
adversarial chosen inputs to Alg, and U
0
is the adversarial software
operation that is used to replace oracle U. The ﬁrst input is called the
honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U
0
; the second input
is called the honest, protected input, which may be known to E, but is
shielded from U
0
; the third input is called the honest, unprotected input,
which may be known to E and U. The other two inputs are generated by
the environment E and include the adversarial, protected input , which is
known by E, but shielded fromU
0
, and the adversarial, unprotected input,
which may be known to both E and U. Similarly, the ﬁrst output is called
the honest output, which is unknown to both E and U
0
; the second is
protected, which may be known by E, but not U
0
; and the third is un-
protected, which may be known by both parties of A.
The following deﬁnition of outsource-security guarantees that the
malicious environment E cannot obtain any useful information of the
secret inputs and outputs of TU
0
, even if T uses the malicious software U
0
written by E.
Deﬁnition 2. (Outsource-security). Let Alg be an algorithm with out-
source input/output. We call a pair of algorithms (T,U) an outsource-
secure actualization of Alg if the ﬂlowings are true:
1) Correctness: TU is a correct implementation of Alg.
2) Security: For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A¼ (E,U0),
the existence of probabilistic expected polynomial-time simulators
(S1,S2) makes no difference in the computation of the following pairs
of random variables.
a) Pair One: EVIEWreal ~ EVIEWideal (The external adversary, E, learns
nothing)
b) Pair Two: UVIEWreal ~ UVIEWideal (The untrusted software, U
0
,
learns nothing)
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introduction can refer to [9].
Deﬁnition 3. (αefﬁcient, secure outsourcing). A pair of algorithms (T,U)
is an αefﬁcient implementation of Alg if (1) TU is a correct imple-
mentation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, and the running time of T is no more
than an α-multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg(x).
Deﬁnition 4. (β-checkable, secure outsourcing). A pair of algorithms
(T,U) is a β-checkable implementation of Alg if (1) TU is a correct
implementation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, and T can detect the error with
a probability of no less than β when U
0
deviates from its advertised
functionality during the execution of TU
0 ðxÞ.
3.2. System model
In this paper, our model includes two entities, the user T and cloud
server U. The user T has some complex computing tasks to calculate but
lacks the computing power. The cloud server has signiﬁcant computing
power, but can only be assumed to be semi-trusted. When users want to
compute modular exponentiations utilizing the cloud server, the process
is as follows:
1) Given the modular exponentiation, user T makes some logical di-
visions to hide the original values and then sends the blinded values
to cloud server U.
2) After receiving the blinded values, U calculates these values and
returns the results to T.
3) After receiving all of the results from U, T can verify their correctness.
The system model for this scenario is shown in Fig. 1.
4. Proposed algorithm for modular exponentiation
We propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm CExp for exponen-
tiation modulo a composite in the one-malicious model [9]. In CExp, T
uses a subroutine called RandN [25], which can speed up computations
and reduce the computational overhead. A requirement for CExp is that
an adversary cannot know any useful information about the inputs and
outputs of CExp. In the following algorithm, U(x,y)→ yx expresses that U
takes (x,y) as the input and outputs yxmodN.
Let p,q be two large primes andN ¼ pq. The input of CExp is u 2 Z*N
and d 2 Z*ϕðNÞ, where ϕ(N)¼ (p1)(q1). The output of CExp isud mod N.Fig. 1. System model.
238Both u and d are computationally blinded to U. (Being computationally
blinded means the base u and exponent d are unknown to the server in
the data outsourcing calculation process). In order to speed up the
computation, we utilize a subroutine called RandN. Upon each invoca-
tion, RandN takes a composite N ¼ pq, an exponent e 2 ZN* and possibly
some other values as inputs, where p,q are primes. The output for each
invocation is a random, independent pair of the form (x, xe mod N), where
x 2 Z*. The proposed algorithm CExp consists of the following sub-
algorithms:4.1. Set up
First, T computes a, where ad ¼ 1modϕ(N). Then T randomly
chooses r 2 Z*N and computes ra mod N. In order to reduce the compu-
tational overhead, T chooses a number r that is as small as possible (e.g.
r 2 [2,10]), so that T can easily compute ramodN. Next T runsRandN four
times to create four blinding pairs ðg1; ge1Þ,ðg2; ge2Þ,ðg3; ge3Þ and ðg4; ge4Þ.
We denote v1 ¼ ge1modNw1 ¼ ge2modN,v2 ¼ ge3modN and w2 ¼ ge4modN.4.2. Division
Our main method is to logically split u and d into random looking
pieces that can be easily computed by U. The ﬁrst logical divisions are
ud ¼ ðg1wÞd
¼ v1gr11 wd
(1)
where w ¼ u/g1 and r1 ¼ d  e.
Through the ﬁrst logical divisions, the base u has been hidden, which
is expressed based on random values for v1,g1 and w. Next, we also need
to hide the exponent d. In order to achieve this goal, the second logical
divisions are
ud ¼ v1gr11 wd
¼ v1ðc1g2Þr1wd
¼ v1cr11 w1gt12 wd
¼ v1cr11 w1gt12 wl1þk1 t1
¼ v1cr11 w1wl1

wk1g2
t1
(2)
where c1 ¼ g1/g2, t1 ¼ r1  e and d ¼ l1 þ k1t1.
The second logical divisions cause d to be blinded by random values
l1,k1 and t1. In order to enhance the security of the inputs, the random
blinding factor t1 should be at least 64 bits long.
Meanwhile, T transforms (u
0
)d using a similar approach,
ðu0Þd ¼ ðg3w0Þd
¼ v2gr13 ðw0Þd
(3)
where u
0¼ u⋅ra, w 0¼ u0/g3 and r1 ¼ de.
ðu0Þd ¼ v2gr13 ðw0Þd
¼ v2ðc2g4Þr1ðw0Þd
¼ v2cr12 w2gt14 ðw0Þd
¼ v2cr12 w2gt14 ðw0Þl1þk1 t1
¼ v2cr12 w2ðw0Þl1

ðw0Þk1g4
t1
(4)
where c2 ¼ g3/g4, t1 ¼ r1  e and d ¼ l1 þ k1t1.4.3. Solve
Using these values (r1,c1), (r1,c2), (l1,w), (k1,w), (l1,w
0
), and (k1,w
0
)
transmitted by T,U computes the followingmodular exponentiations and
returns the corresponding computing results to T.
S. Li et al. Digital Communications and Networks 3 (2017) 236–241ðr1; c1Þ→cr11 ;
ðr1; c2Þ→cr12 ;
ðl1;wÞ→wl1 ;
ðk1;wÞ→wk1 ;
ðl1;w0Þ→ðw0Þl1 ;
ðk1;w0Þ→ðw0Þk1 :
(5)
4.4. Verify
T checks whether U has produced the correct output, i.e.,
r

v1c
r1
1 w1w
l1

wk1g2
t1¼? v2cr12 w2ðw0Þl1

ðw0Þk1g4
t1
(6)
If not, it indicates thatU has producedwrong responses, and T outputs
“error”; otherwise, T can compute the ﬁnal result
ud ¼ v1cr11 w1wl1

wk1g2
t1 (7)
5. Security evaluation
In this section, we provide a security analysis for the proposed algo-
rithm CExp in the one-malicious model, along with a comparison of
different algorithms.5.1. Security analysisTheorem 1. (Outsource-security). Based on the single untrusted program
model, the above algorithms (T,U) are an outsource-secure implementation of
CExp, where the input (d,u) may be honest, secret; honest, protected; or
adversarial, protected.
Proof: The correctness property is obvious. If U performs honestly, T
can compute
ud ¼ v1cr11 w1wl1

wk1g2
t1
¼ v1cr11 w1gt12 wl1þk1 t1
¼ v1cr11 w1gt12 wd
¼ v1ðc1g2Þr1wd
¼ v1gr11 wd
¼ ðg1wÞd
¼ ud
(8)
ðu0Þd ¼ v2cr12 w2ðw0Þl1

ðw0Þk1g4
t1
¼ v2cr12 w2gt14 ðw0Þl1þk1 t1
¼ v2cr12 w2gt14 ðw0Þd
¼ v2ðc2g4Þr1 ðw0Þd
¼ v2gr13 ðw0Þd
¼ ðg3w0Þd
¼ ðu0Þd
(9)
Based on equations (8) and (9), equation (6) is established as long as U
generates correct responses.
rud ¼ ðu0Þd
rv1c
r1
1 w1w
l1

wk1g2
t1 ¼ v2cr12 w2ðw0Þl1

ðw0Þk1g4
t1 (10)
Next we prove the security. First, we prove Pair One EVIE-
Wreal~EVIEWideal: if the input (d,u) is not the case of an honest, secret input,E
can always know the input information. Obviously, the execution process of
the simulator S1 will be the same as that of a real experiment in this case.
Consequently, we only need to consider the case of an honest, secret input. In
the ideal experiment, the execution process of the simulator S1 is as follows:
after receiving the input on round i, S1 ignores it and instead makes six random
queries of the form (αj,βj) to U
0
. After that S1 checks six outputs β
aj
j from U
0
. If239an error has been detected, S1 saves all of the states and outputs YiP ¼ “error”;
Yiu ¼ φ; repi ¼ 1, and at this time the output for ideal process is
(estatei,“error”,φ). If all the checks have been passed, S1 outputs YiP ¼ φ; Yiu ¼
φ; repi¼ 0, and at this point, the output for the ideal process is ðestatei; yip; yiuÞ.
Additionally, we need to illustrate that the input distributions to U
0
are
computationally indistinguishable in the real and ideal experiments. In the
ideal experiment, the inputs are selected randomly and uniformly. In the real
experiment, each part of the query that T makes to U is independently re-
randomized and computationally indistinguishable. If U
0
behaves honestly
on round i, then EVIEWireal  EVIEWiideal. Because TU
0 correctly executes CExp
in the real experiment and S1 simulates with the same outputs in the ideal
experiment, i.e., repi ¼ 0. If U0 is dishonest on round i and returns incorrect
calculation results, then the error will be detected by both T and S1 with a
probability of one, resulting in an output of “error”. Thus,
EVIEWireal~EVIEW
i
ideal even when U
0
misbehaves. By the hybrid argument, we
conclude that EVIEWreal ~ EVIEWideal.
Second, we prove Pair TwoUVIEWreal ~ UVIEWideal. If the input (d,u) is
not honest, secret; honest, protected; or adversarial, protected, U
0
can always
know the input information. Obviously, the execution process of the simulator
S2 will be the same as a real experiment in this case. Consequently, we only
need to consider the case where the input is honest, secret; honest, protected; or
adversarial, protected. In the ideal experimental environment, S2 always be-
haves as follows: after getting the input on round i, S2 ignores it and instead
makes six random queries of the form (αj,βj) to U
0
. After that S2 saves its states
and the state of U
0
. Similar to that previously shown, it can be demonstrated
that UVIEWireal~UVIEW
i
ideal and the inputs to U
0
in the real experiment are
computationally indistinguishable from those in the ideal one randomly
selected by S2. Consequently, although E can easily distinguish between these
real and ideal experiments, E cannot communicate this information to U
0
.
Therefore, we conclude that UVIEWreal ~ UVIEWideal.
Theorem 2. (O

2kþlog t1þlog a
n

-efﬁcient CExp). In the single untrusted
program model, the above algorithms (T,U) are an O

2kþlog t1þlog a
n

-efﬁcient
secure implementation of CExp.
Proof: On one hand, the proposed algorithm CExp makes four calls toR
and N plus (14 þ 3logt1 þ 1.5loga) Modular Multiplication (MM) and four
Modular Inverse (MInv) operations in order to compute ud modN. In addi-
tion, CExp takes 2k MM using the BPV generator in [25], where k is a
parameter related to the size of the subset sum. On the other hand, it takes
roughly 1.5n MM to calculate ud mod N by the square-and-multiply method,
where n is the bit of d. Thus, the algorithms (T,U) are an
O

2kþlog t1þlog a
n

-efﬁcient implementation of CExp.
Theorem 3. (1-checkable CExp). In the single untrusted program model,
the above algorithms(T,U) are a 1-checkable implementation of CExp.
Proof:When T receives the computing results from U, T can verify whether
equation (6) is established.
r

v1c
r1
1 w1w
l1

wk1g2
t1¼? v2cr12 w2ðw0Þl1

ðw0Þk1g4
t1
If the equation does not hold, this indicates that U has produced wrong
responses. T will detect the misbehavior of server U with a probability of one.5.2. Comparison
We compare the proposed algorithm with the state-of-the-art algo-
rithms [10] [14]. Let MM denote a modular multiplication, MInv
denote a modular inverse, and Invoke denote an invocation of the
subroutineRandN. We omit other operations such as modular additions in
these algorithms because the computation of these operations is negli-
gible compared to the others. A comparison of the efﬁciency and
checkability of these algorithms is provided in Table 1.
According to Table 1, we can see that the checkability of CExp is much
higher than those of Exp [10], and GExp [14]. In CExp, the outsourcer
Table 1
Comparison of the algorithms.
Exp [10] GExp [14] Our CExp
Security Model Two UP Single UP Single UP
MM 7 12 þ 1.5logχ 14þ3logt1þ1.5loga
MInv 3 4 4
Invoke (Rand) 5 6 4
Invoke (U) 6 4 6
Checkability 2/3 1/2 1
(“Two/Single UP” denotes Two/Single Untrusted Program Model respectively).
Fig. 2. Simulation for CExp algorithm.
Fig. 4. Time cost of.ud.
S. Li et al. Digital Communications and Networks 3 (2017) 236–241can detect any misbehavior with a probability of one. Thus, it is not
possible for the outsourcer to be cheated by the cloud server. Although
Exp [10] performs better in terms of the benchmark MM, it is based on
the two untrusted program models. Thus, Exp [10] may suffer from
collusion attack. Compared with GExp [14], our CExp needs to pay
additional 1.5loga MM to calculate the value of ra. Note that when it
comes to variable-based and ﬁxed-exponent exponentiation case, we can
reduce the computational overhead by amortization, since we can reuse
the ra.Fig. 3. Time cost of.ud.
2406. Performance evaluation
We implemented our proposed outsourcing algorithm using the Py-
thon language. Our experiment was conducted on two machines with
Intel Core i5 processors running at 3.20 GHz with 4G of memory (cloud
server), and an Intel Core i5 processor running at 2.10 GHz with 2G of
memory (local user).
Fig. 2 shows the time cost results of computing the modular expo-
nentiation with the CExp algorithm and without the outsourcing algo-
rithm. The time cost for CExp is smaller than that for computing modular
exponentiation without outsourcing. By utilizing our proposed
outsourcing algorithm, the time cost can be greatly reduced because
CExp delegates some heavy calculations to U. In this way the user can
afford the computational overhead, which is much less than before. In
Fig. 3, we provide the simulation results of the CExp algorithm, with the
time costs of different exponent bit lengths. Computing the modular
exponentiation without outsourcing is rather time-consuming. Note that
the time cost of computing the modular exponentiation without an
outsourcing algorithm increases relatively quickly as the bit length of the
exponent grows. By utilizing our proposed outsourcing algorithm CExp,
the time cost increases slowly with the bit length of the exponent. The
time costs with different bit lengths for the base is shown in Fig. 4. As
the bit length of the base increases, the time cost of the modular expo-
nentiation without outsourcing increases, but the time cost for CExp is
almost constant.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new algorithm for the secure outsourcing
of composite modular exponentiation with only one untrusted server,
which avoids the risk of a collusion attack. In addition, the proposed
algorithm can guarantee the privacy of the outsourced data. After logi-
cally splitting the data into random looking pieces, the cloud server
cannot obtain any sensitive information. In particular, in our proposed
algorithm, the outsourcer can detect any misbehavior of the server with a
probability of one. In addition, the analysis and experimental results
show that our proposed algorithm is provably secure and efﬁcient.
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